Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have submitted testimony, which I assume will be in the record.

I listened with great interest to the questions

directed at Secretary Armitage, and I very much agree with

you, Senator Biden, that he’s a terrific witness.

I wanted to address a question that Senator Chafee asked. He’s

no longer here, but he said, ‘‘What went wrong after 1994?’’ And

I may have a somewhat unusual perspective on that since I went

to North Korea twice last year, spent about 20 hours talking with

both military and political leaders, and I have some sense of what’s

on their minds.

First of all, I would say that I think, although Kim Jong Il is in

control, he has to work at that, and he works at it by his militaryfirst

policy. I think his hope to eventually develop North Korea into

a more normal state is very much under suspicion on the part of

his military and the hardline Communist/Marxist leaders.

The North Koreans were full of questions in April, when I first

went. ‘‘Why is George Bush so different from his father? Why does

George Bush dislike Bill Clinton so much? Why does this administration

use such harsh rhetoric in describing us?’’

Well, I had one rule in the talks, and that

was that I would not criticize my President any more than I would

expect them to criticize their chairman.

So my answer to the first question was, George W. Bush is a

Texan, and his father was a New Englander. And my answer to the

second question is that, George Bush doesn’t like Bill Clinton because

Bill Clinton defeated his father in 1992, and how would Kim

Jong Il feel about somebody who had done something similar to

that to his father?

Why is the rhetoric so harsh? We’re at war. We are very angry.

We have seen horrible things happen in our cities. And that was

really the reason that I wrote a letter to the chairman and said,

‘‘It’s imperative that our two countries talk.’’

My take on what I heard from them is that, from their signing

of the 1994 Agreed Framework, they had hoped that this would be

the start of a new era, but that with the election results of 1994,

where there was a change in the leadership in at least—I’ve forgotten,

was it both in the House and the Senate or both?

There was a great deal of skepticism voiced

about the Agreed Framework by the newly ascendant Republican

leadership and some of the ancillary agreements designed to improve

the overall relationship between North and South—North

Korea and the United States were not—were not followed up.

The terrific work that Dr. Carter and Secretary Powell did in

1998 headed off a second crisis, and things progressed very rapidly

when North Korea sent Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok to Washington.

He was invited to the White House. He went there in uniform,

which was quite a sight. He invited President Clinton to visit

North Korea, and President Clinton sent Secretary of State Madeleine

Albright to check that out.

She came back, invited about 30 Korean specialists to dinner,

and said, ‘‘What do you think? Should President Clinton go?’’ Two

of the members there said, ‘‘No, under no circumstances.’’ About

three said, ‘‘Yes, you should, under any circumstance.’’ The rest of

us were spread out in the misty flats saying, ‘‘Only go if certain

things are settled.’’

Well, President Clinton almost went. And I was approached by

his senior North Korean policy advisor in December 2000, who

asked my advice on that. And I said, ‘‘Well, I won’t give advice, but

I’ll certainly listen to where you are.’’

I said, ‘‘Do you have a missile deal?’’ And she said, ‘‘Almost.’’ She

said, ‘‘There were two or three very key questions that we are trying

to get out of the North Koreans in Kuala Lumpur, but we can’t

get them to answer. We think they know the answer, but they

won’t answer.’’

I said, ‘‘I think what Kim Jong Il is doing is holding those in reserve

to give as presents to President Clinton if he goes.’’ And the

question, then, ‘‘Does the American President go hat in hand to

North Korea with the hope and expectation that he will get a missile

deal?’’ And I said, ‘‘That’s his choice.’’ And in the end, he decided

that he would not go.

I think that the North Koreans had every expectation, because

their overt behavior had not changed in any way, that there would

be more continuity between Clinton and the incoming Bush administration

than there was. Kim Dae-Jung came to Washington, I

think in March 2001, had a very bad meeting, was told that a policy

review was going to be undertaken.

That was completed in June. The agenda from the policy review

had changed. It was a much more difficult one for the North Koreans

to come to grips with. Then came 9/11, which changed the

world. And then came the State of the Union speech with the ‘‘axis

of evil’’ rhetoric.

After that, Jim Kelly prepared a bold approach. That was delayed

by the sea skirmish between North and South Korea in the

western Yellow Sea in June. And then we learned of the secret

North Korean uranium enrichment program with the Pakistanis.

And there were those in the administration who insisted that that

be the No. 1 issue on Kelly’s agenda when he went to North Korea.

So here were the North Koreans, who had hoped for the start of

a dialog, and all they got was confrontation.

I’d like to say a word about the Pakistani connection. They have

had a long and intimate association with the Pakistanis. They have

dealt with Pakistani nuclear scientists and technicians, and I

think, from those men, they have gathered the sense of security

which Pakistan thinks it has accrued to itself by acquiring nuclear

weapons. And I think that that has had a seductive impact on certain

aspects of the North Korean regime.

And so here we are. The hardest thing for me to explain is why

they cheated on the Agreed Framework. And the best answer I can

come up with is that they have not heard much support for the

Agreed Framework from the administration. Some of its ancillary

stipulations were not implemented. And the body language from

this administration was very tough.

I think they correctly assessed President Bush as a very effective,

tough wartime leader. I think they expect the war with Iraq,

if it comes, to be short. And I think that they have a heavy expectation

that they are next. And I think that that accounts for their

drive toward nuclear weapons.

Can it be stopped? Don Oberdorfer, who accompanied me on my

second trip, in November, is doubtful that it can be. I am more optimistic,

because on two occasions I have seen last-minute interventions—

the first by Jimmy Carter in 1994, which turned around a

very dangerous situation; and the second, the intervention by Ash

Carter and Bill Perry.

I think the North Koreans want a security guarantee from the

United States. They know that only we can give it, and that is why

they are insisting on talks with us. And I was very relieved to hear

that Secretary Armitage says these talks will take place.

A word on South Korea. The South Koreans are, sort of, in shock

at looking at who have they elected for President. And as Armitage

said, it was a generational shift. Younger South Koreans have forgotten

that they are suppose to be eternally grateful to us for 1950

and are more interested in their relations with North Korea than

they are in maintaining relations with the United States which

they feel have gone stale.

Why do they feel that? I think they feel that, because although

we have absolutely legitimate global concerns about proliferation,

we have not been accurate in calibrating how those concerns impact

in a regional context. And the South Koreans have heard

much more about U.S. policy toward Asia from proliferation specialists,

who know a great deal about proliferation, but know zero

about Asia. They have seen far less of Mr. Kelly than they should

have, and far more of other officials, who I think have not advanced

our regional concerns.

So I still am somewhat optimistic. I think the meeting between

President Bush and the newly elected President Roh is a very important

one. I think the South Koreans very much want to have

our troops remain. I think they very much want to have us perceived

as being in favor of reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula,

and they have lost their clarity on that issue. So I think if we are

somehow able to reassure them that we are interested in reconciliation,

that we are not set on regime change in the north, they will

be very much reassured.

It’s very difficult to sit here making any kind of a case for Kim

Jong Il. Those of you who saw 60 Minutes two nights ago or saw

the Newsweek cover 2 weeks ago, called Dr. Evil, I sort of, feel almost

like a Quisling in saying we ought to deal with this guy. And

yet I think that is our best option, and that, I think, is the unanimous

view of North Korea’s neighbors, and I think we ought to

take that very seriously.

Thank you very much, Senator.

Just a couple. I had breakfast yesterday

morning with the chairman of one of South Korea’s leading corporations.

They make microchips, a multi-billion-dollar success.

They have some very basic concerns. One, they are worried that—

the new President, when he comes—will not be received with the

proper courtesy. I assured them that he would be. Second, they are

worried that our President is focused on regime change rather than

working with North Korea as it is, as repulsive as it is. And this

may be the voice of old Asia, to paraphrase Secretary Rumsfeld’s

statement but they were saying that if you want to remove a leader

in Asia, if you want to remove the mandate of heaven from him,

that has to be done by his own people. And so they said, ‘‘Help us

to open up the windows in North Korea. And then if he still has

the mandate of heaven, we can work with him.’’

And then, finally, they said Roh Moo Hyun is a lawyer and that

everything that the President says to him must stress logic and evidence.

Your very interesting comments, Senator,

remind me of my early days in CIA when there was a decision to

undertake regime change by covert means, and then came Guatemala,

Iran, and the disaster in Cuba. And it came to a stop. But

an awful lot was lost out of that process, and we are still alienated

from Iran. So I’m very much against it.

I think some of the hard-line people in the administration have

no clear awareness of the consequences of what they are suggesting.

I think the President is coming to realize that, and I take

great hope from that.

I do not think there is much likelihood of a

collapse in the near term.

The Chinese have told me that he took as

long as he did to assume full leadership in North Korea because

he took great care to make certain that he had real control over

the military. And his choice of Jo Myong Rok, to send to Washington

in the fall of 2000, was an indication of that, as he reached

down into the ranks to pull up a man whom he trusted.

I think that the more we appear to threaten North Korea, the

more threatened the North Korean army and military acts and the

more claims they lay on Kim Jong Il. I think his ultimate hope is

to be able to have a special economic zone, like Kaesung, filled with

workers making widgets with which he can buy food for his starving

people. For that to happen, he has to be able to disarm some

of his conventional military forces, and those guys do not want to

be disarmed if they think that, by disarming, that opens up an attack

from us.

So that is how I see it, that he is in charge, but he has to cater

to the just absolutely imperative support of the military.